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The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine sharply limited the availability of
implied preemption as a defense in pharmaceutical cases. In this Analysis & Perspective,
attorney Brian Wolfman discusses the decision and its implications for prescription drug
litigation as well as litigation in other areas that are regulated by the federal government.
After Wyeth, Wolfman says, a defendant in a prescription drug case must demonstrate a
‘‘tight fit between the labeling change proposed by the manufacturer (and rejected by the
FDA) and the labeling change that the plaintiff contends would have prevented her inju-
ries.’’ Moreover, he says, in light of Wyeth, agency claims of preemption with respect to
other products or services are likely to be subject to increased judicial scrutiny, and it is un-
likely that these claims will be accorded substantial deference unless they are tethered to a
congressional authorization regarding preemption.
Wyeth v. Levine and Its Implications
BY BRIAN WOLFMAN I. Introduction
O n March 2, the Supreme Court ruled in Wyeth v.Levine1 that approval of the prescription drugPhenergan and its labeling by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) did not preempt plaintiff Diana
Levine’s state-law tort claim premised on defendant
Wyeth’s failure to warn adequately about one of Phen-
ergan’s risks. My intent here is not to write from a
plaintiff’s or a defendant’s perspective, but, rather, to
1 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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describe the Court’s decision and to assess how it may
affect litigation involving prescription drugs and other
federally regulated products and services.
Because it is difficult to understand Wyeth without
appreciating the facts of the case and the basics of fed-
eral drug regulation, those topics are addressed in Part
II below. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, and Part IV discusses its likely effects.
II. Background
A. The Facts
On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine, a Vermont musician,
received injections of Wyeth’s prescription drug Phen-
ergan to treat nausea associated with a migraine head-
ache.2 The drug was first administered by intramuscu-
lar injection. Later that day, the drug was administered
intravenously through a technique known as direct IV,
or ‘‘IV-push.’’3 In this method, a syringe pushes medi-
cation directly into the patient’s vein. The method is
called ‘‘direct’’ to distinguish it from a more common
means of intravenous administration in which the medi-
cation is placed into a stream of saline flowing from a
hanging IV bag.4 As the Supreme Court noted, the lat-
ter method is nearly risk-free.5 On the other hand, when
Phenergan is administered by the IV-push method, in-
advertent exposure to arterial blood may result, which,
in turn, may lead to gangrene and amputation.6 The tes-
timony at trial showed that, prior to Ms. Levine’s injec-
tion, there had been at least 20 reported cases in which
IV-push administration of Phenergan had caused an
amputation.7
As a result of IV-push administration of Phenergan,
the drug penetrated Ms. Levine’s artery.8 For seven
weeks after the injection, Ms. Levine suffered severe
physical and emotional pain as her right hand turned
black and died.9 Ms. Levine endured two amputations.
She first lost her right hand and then her right arm up
to the elbow.10
B. The FDA Drug Approval Process, the FDCA’s
Relationship With State Law, and Approval of the
Phenergan Label
1. FDA Approval and Drug Labeling
Since its enactment in 1938, the federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has governed the entry of
prescription drugs on the market. A manufacturer seek-
ing to market a prescription drug must file a new drug
application (NDA) with the FDA.11 The agency must ap-
prove the NDA ‘‘unless it fails to meet certain criteria,
including whether test results and other information es-
tablish that the drug is ‘safe for use under the condi-
tions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling thereof,’ whether there is ‘substantial
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or
is represented to have under the conditions of use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed la-
beling thereof,’ and whether, ‘based on a fair evaluation
of all material facts, such labeling is false or misleading
in any particular.’ ’’12
Because prescription drug labeling provides informa-
tion used by clinicians to prescribe and administer an
approved drug, FDA regulations describe in detail the
proper form and content for labeling.13 After FDA ap-
proval, a drug generally must be accompanied by label-
ing in the same form as approved by the FDA.14 The la-
bel’s content is not, however, set in stone. Rather, a
manufacturer is required to alter its labeling in certain
circumstances. An FDA regulation provides that ap-
proved drug ‘‘labeling shall be revised to include a
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an
association of a serious hazard with a drug.’’15 In addi-
tion, the FDA is not required to approve all label
changes before drug manufacturers make them. At the
time of Ms. Levine’s Phenergan injection, manufactur-
ers were permitted, pursuant to the FDA’s so-called
‘‘changes being effected,’’ or CBE, regulation, to revise
labels, without prior FDA approval, to ‘‘add or
strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction’’ [or to] ‘‘add or strengthen an instruc-
tion about dosage and administration that is intended to
increase the safe use of the drug product.’’16
In 2008, the FDA amended the CBE regulation to au-
thorize only those label changes that ‘‘reflect newly ac-
quired information.’’17 The revised regulation’s defini-
tion of ‘‘ ‘newly acquired information’ is not limited to
new data, but also encompasses ‘new analyses of previ-
ously submitted data.’ ’’18
2. The Relationship Between Federal Drug Regulation and
State Law
In the 70 years since the FDCA’s enactment, the
states’ common-law tort systems have provided com-
pensation for injuries caused by prescription drugs,
and, until recently, courts had held uniformly that fed-
eral law does not preempt tort claims seeking redress
for such injuries.19 As contrasted with medical de-
vices,20 the FDCA contains no preemption provision re-
garding prescription drugs. And, as noted in Wyeth, an
initial draft of the FDCA contained a right of action for
damages sustained from drug-related injuries, which
2 Id. at 1191.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1192.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1191.
7 Id. at 1197 (citing trial testimony).
8 Id. at 1190-91.
9 Levine v. Wyeth, trial transcript, Vol. III, at 38 (testimony
of Dr. Mark Bucksbaum) (‘‘Pain scales usually are run from
one to ten. This is a ten. . . . there’s not much worse than this
type of scenario.’’); id. at 165-66 (testimony of Diana Levine)
(describing excruciating pain, terror, and fear of losing arm
and dying).
10 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
11 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
12 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 185 (Vt. 2006) (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 355(d)), aff’d sub nom., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (2009).
13 See generally 21 C.F.R. Part 201.
14 See id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v).
15 Id. § 201.80(e).
16 Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C).
17 Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii); see 73 Fed. Reg. 49603 (2008).
18 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. at 49604).
19 For cases stating the traditional no-preemption view, see,
e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods. Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537 (6th
Cir. 1993); Osburn v. Anchor Labs., 825 F.2d 908, 911-13 (5th
Cir. 1987); Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746
(11th Cir. 1986); Carlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 1104,
1113 (Cal. 1996); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 1176,
1185-97 (N.J. 1991).
20 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
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was apparently eliminated ‘‘because common-law
claims were already available under state law.’’21
Until earlier this decade, the FDA had never sug-
gested that state-law product liability suits are pre-
empted by the FDCA or by the agency’s approval of a
drug’s labeling. In fact, on at least two occasions, the
FDA took a different view. In 1979 and 1998, in pre-
ambles accompanying drug regulations, the agency
stated that state tort law did not interfere with federal
regulation and that federal regulation should not influ-
ence state-law liability.22
In December 2000, the FDA proposed to amend its
drug labeling regulations. At that time, the agency
noted that the amended ‘‘rule would ‘not contain poli-
cies that have federalism implications or that preempt
State law.’ ’’23 In 2006, however, in finalizing these la-
beling rules, the agency took a different view, claiming
in the regulatory preamble that, in some circumstances,
the FDA’s approval of a prescription drug’s labeling
preempts a state tort claim premised on the manufac-
turer’s failure to warn of hazards associated with the
drug.24 Tort defendants claimed that the 2006 preamble
was entitled to judicial deference in drug-injury litiga-
tion because it expressed the authoritative views of the
agency charged with administering the FDCA. The
lower courts split on that question, with some courts,
including the Vermont Supreme Court in Wyeth, reject-
ing deference to the agency’s view on preemption,25
and other courts embracing it.26
3. History of The Phenergan Label
Phenergan and its labeling were first approved by the
FDA in 1955.27 As detailed in the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion, between 1973 and 1998, the FDA and Wyeth en-
gaged in sporadic exchanges concerning the drug’s la-
beling, prompted mainly by a 1981 submission made by
Wyeth in response to new FDA labeling rules.28 At one
point, the agency requested a revised warning on arte-
rial exposure to Phenergan, and Wyeth submitted a re-
vision (which Wyeth later contended constituted a
strengthened warning about the risks of IV-push ad-
ministration). Ultimately, however, the agency did not
approve Wyeth’s submission, but instead instructed the
company to ‘‘[r]etain [the] verbiage in [the] current la-
bel.’’29
4. Proceedings in the Vermont Courts
Ms. Levine sued Wyeth in Vermont Superior Court to
recover compensation for her life-altering injuries. The
jury awarded damages based on its determination that
Wyeth’s ‘‘inadequate label’’ caused Ms. Levine’s injury,
and that ‘‘the critical defect in Phenergan’s label was
the lack of an adequate warning about the risks of IV-
push administration.’’30 The Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed. It rejected Wyeth’s preemption arguments
and found that there was ‘‘no evidence’’ that the FDA
had considered, much less rejected, a specific request
by Wyeth to strengthen the Phenergan label with re-
spect to the risks of IV-push administration.31
III. The Supreme Court’s Decision
As noted at the outset, the Supreme Court ruled 6 to
3 for Diana Levine, rejecting Wyeth’s preemption argu-
ment and upholding the jury’s verdict in Ms. Levine’s
favor. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for a five-justice
majority that included Justices Anthony M. Kennedy,
David H. Souter, Stephen G. Breyer, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Justice Breyer, joining fully in the majority
opinion, wrote a short concurring opinion expressing
his views on regulatory preemption. Justice Clarence
Thomas concurred in the judgment, but wrote sepa-
rately to explain that the majority’s ruling went too far
in its ‘‘implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied
preemption doctrine.’’32 Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice
Antonin Scalia, dissented. The first three opinions are
discussed below, with emphasis on the majority opinion
because it will likely have the greatest influence on fu-
ture preemption doctrine. Justice Alito’s dissent pro-
vides a comprehensive rebuttal to the majority and ex-
plains why, in Justice Alito’s view, the Court’s Su-
premacy Clause precedents and the FDA’s role in
assessing the risks and benefits of prescription drugs
warranted a finding of preemption. Because the dissent
is unlikely to influence future tort litigation, at least in
the near term, it is not discussed further here.
A. Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinion
1. Framing the Issues
Justice Stevens’s opinion begins by summarizing the
facts, the issue before the Court, and the majority’s con-
clusion:
Directly injecting the drug Phenergan into a pa-
tient’s vein creates a significant risk of cata-
strophic consequences. A Vermont jury found that
petitioner Wyeth, the manufacturer of the drug,
had failed to provide an adequate warning of that
risk and awarded damages to respondent Diana
Levine to compensate her for the amputation of
her arm. The warnings on Phenergan’s label had
been deemed sufficient by the federal Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) when it approved
Wyeth’s new drug application in 1955 and when it
later approved changes in the drug’s labeling. The
question we must decide is whether the FDA’s ap-
provals provide Wyeth with a complete defense to
21 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 n.7 (citing FDCA’s legislative
history).
22 See 63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (1998) (‘‘FDA does not be-
lieve that the evolution of state tort law will cause the develop-
ment of standards that would be at odds with the agency’s
regulations.’’); 44 Fed. Reg. 37434, 37437 (1979) (‘‘It is not the
intent of the FDA to influence the civil tort liability of the
manufacturer.’’); see also Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201-02 & n.10
(also citing 59 Fed. Reg. 3948 (1994)).
23 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 81082,
81103 (2000)).
24 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-36 (2006) (hereafter ‘‘2006 pre-
amble’’).
25 See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 192-94; see also, e.g.,
Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97 n.9 (2d Cir.
2006), aff’d by equally divided court sub nom., Warner-
Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008).
26 See, e.g., In re Bextra & Celebrex Marketing Sales Prac-
tices and Prod. Liab. Litig., 2006 WL 2374742, *6-*7 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
27 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1192.
28 See id.
29 See id. (quoting FDA correspondence).
30 Id. at 1194.
31 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 93.
32 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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Levine’s tort claims. We conclude that they do
not.33
Thereafter, the Court framed Wyeth’s preemption ar-
guments. Because the FDCA does not expressly pre-
empt state authority with respect to prescription drugs,
the question before the Court, Justice Stevens ex-
plained, was whether Ms. Levine’s state-law claims
were impliedly preempted either because ‘‘it would
have been impossible for [Wyeth] to comply with the
state-law duty to modify Phenergan’s labeling without
violating federal law,’’34 or because Ms. Levine’s suit
posed an ‘‘unacceptable ‘obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.’ ’’35
Justice Stevens made two preliminary legal observa-
tions. The first was boilerplate and not in dispute: that
‘‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every preemption case.’’36 The second, very much in
dispute, concerned the so-called presumption against
preemption of state law: that ‘‘ ‘the historic police pow-
ers of the States were not to be superseded by [a] Fed-
eral Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress,’ ’’ particularly ‘‘ ‘in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied.’ ’’37 This presumption has
long been targeted by tort defendants because, as the
Court has explained, it applies to state tort law as well
as state positive law.38 Justice Stevens rejected the drug
industry’s broad claim ‘‘that the presumption against
preemption should not apply to claims of implied con-
flict preemption at all,’’39 noting that ‘‘this Court has
long held to the contrary.’’40 He also rejected Wyeth’s
narrower claim that the presumption should not apply
to Ms. Levine’s case because the federal government
has a long history of regulating drug labeling. ‘‘That ar-
gument,’’ Justice Stevens explained, ‘‘misunderstands’’
the presumption against preemption, which ‘‘accounts
for the historic presence of state law but does not rely
on the absence of federal regulation.’’41
2. ‘‘Impossibility’’ Preemption
The Court then turned to Wyeth’s ‘‘impossibility’’ ar-
gument: that Wyeth could not comply with both the
state-law duty to warn Ms. Levine’s physicians of the
risks of IV-push administration of Phenergan and its
federal labeling obligations under the FDCA. The Court
rejected this argument, first, on the basis of the CBE
regulation, which, as explained above, authorizes a
drug manufacturer unilaterally to update a drug label to
add or strengthen warnings, including warnings about
methods of drug administration.42
The Court did not reach the question whether the
2008 amendment to the CBE regulation, which states
that manufacturers may only unilaterally amend their
labels ‘‘to reflect newly acquired information,’’43 ap-
plied retroactively to Ms. Levine’s claim, or, as Wyeth
maintained, did no more than ‘‘reaffirm[] the interpre-
tation of the regulation in effect when this case was
tried.’’44 Rather, the Court held that, because the
amended regulation defined ‘‘newly acquired informa-
tion’’ to include new analyses of existing data,45 after
learning of at least 20 amputations resulting from IV-
push injections of Phenergan prior to Ms. Levine’s in-
jury, ‘‘Wyeth could have analyzed the accumulating
data and added a stronger warning about IV-push ad-
ministration of the drug.’’46 The Court also emphasized
that, in 2007, when Congress amended the FDCA to
provide the FDA authority to require manufacturers to
amend their labels to enhance safety, Congress reiter-
ated that, despite the FDA’s new authority, manufactur-
ers could still use the CBE regulation to make label
changes on their own.47
The Court rejected Wyeth’s claim that a Phenergan
label updated through the CBE regulation would have
been misbranded under federal law. The Court noted
that, under the FDCA, a label is misbranded if it fails to
contain ‘‘adequate warnings,’’48 and that, presumably, a
label is not rendered inadequate simply because it has
been updated using the CBE regulation, which is an
FDA-authorized means for unilaterally amending a
drug label. As Justice Stevens put it: ‘‘[T]he very idea
that the FDA would bring an enforcement action
against a manufacturer for strengthening a warning
pursuant to the CBE regulation is difficult to accept—
neither Wyeth nor the United States has identified a
case in which the FDA has done so.’’49 The Court also
explained that a drug is not misbranded based on
‘‘FDA’s belief’’ that misbranding has occurred;50 rather,
a jury (or, presumably, some other adjudicator) makes
conclusive misbranding determinations.51
Having rejected Wyeth’s ‘‘cramped reading of the
CBE regulation’’ and its view of misbranding,52 Justice
Stevens turned to what he termed Wyeth’s ‘‘more fun-
damental’’ misunderstanding of the FDCA.53 Dismiss-
ing Wyeth’s view that the FDA ‘‘bears primary respon-
sibility for drug labeling,’’54 Justice Stevens reviewed
FDA regulations that, he said, make the manufacturer
responsible for the content of drug labels ‘‘at all
times.’’55 He pointed primarily to 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e),
which requires all prescription drug manufacturers to
33 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1190-91.
34 Id. at 1193 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De
la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982)).
35 Id. at 1194 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67
(1941)).
36 Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996)).
37 Id. (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485).
38 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (‘‘[B]ecause the States are indepen-
dent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed
that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of
action.’’).
39 Wyeth, 129 U.S. at 1195 n.3.
40 Id. (citing cases).
41 Id.
42 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C).
43 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. at 49609).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1197 (discussing 73 Fed. Reg. at 49604, 49607).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1198 (Congress ‘‘reaffirmed the manufacturer’s ob-
ligations and referred specifically to the CBE regulation, which
both reflects the manufacturer’s ultimate responsibility for its
label and provides a mechanism for adding safety information
to the label prior to FDA approval.’’) (citing 121 Stat. 925–26).
The relevant FDCA amendment is codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(o)(4)(I).
48 Id. at 1197 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 334(a)-(b)).
52 Id..
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1198 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.80, 314.80(b); 73 Fed.
Reg. at 49605).
4
5-11-09 COPYRIGHT  2009 BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. PSLR ISSN 0092-7732
revise their labels ‘‘to include a warning as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of an association of a seri-
ous hazard with a drug.’’56
Acknowledging that the FDA has authority to reject a
labeling change made pursuant to the CBE regulation,
the Court then turned to the FDA’s review of the Phen-
ergan label, explaining that ‘‘absent clear evidence’’
that the agency would not have approved a label change
of the kind that would have prevented Ms. Levine’s in-
jury, ‘‘we will not conclude that it was impossible for
Wyeth to comply with both federal and state require-
ments.’’57 Based on the record of the case, as set out at
some length by the Vermont Supreme Court,58 the
Court held that ‘‘Wyeth has offered no such evi-
dence.’’59 The Court explained that the Vermont courts
had rejected, ‘‘as a matter of fact,’’60 Wyeth’s conten-
tion that when the FDA had told Wyeth to retain the
‘‘current verbiage’’ in its label (and did not adopt
Wyeth’s revised label), it had not rejected a strength-
ened warning against IV-push administration. The
Court noted that even the FDA did not construe its re-
jection of Wyeth’s revised Phenergan label as relating
to IV-push administration of the drug; rather, the
agency acknowledged in its Supreme Court brief that
Wyeth’s proposed revision was ‘‘non-substantive’’ and
that the FDA had rejected it for ‘‘formatting reasons.’’61
In sum, the Court concluded, ‘‘impossibility’’ preemp-
tion ‘‘is a demanding defense,’’62 which Wyeth had not
met.
3. ‘‘Obstacle’’ or ‘‘Frustration of Purposes’’ Preemption
Justice Stevens then turned to Wyeth’s argument that
state-law liability would pose an obstacle to the objec-
tives of federal drug labeling regulation. The Court’s re-
sponse was plain: ‘‘The most glaring problem with this
argument is that all evidence of Congress’ purposes is
to the contrary.’’63 It noted that Congress (1) rejected a
federal damages remedy in the bill that ultimately be-
came the FDCA because damages remedies were al-
ready available under state law;64 and (2) had not en-
acted an express preemption provision at any time dur-
ing the FDCA’s 70-year history, as it had for medical
devices in 1976.65
The Court then turned to the FDA’s 2006 preamble,
which, as explained above, concluded that state tort
claims are preempted in some circumstances by the
FDA’s approval of a drug’s label. For a number of rea-
sons, the Court held that the preamble was ‘‘entitled to
no weight’’:66
s The preamble was an ‘‘agency proclamation[] of
preemption,’’ not a regulation promulgated pursuant to
a statute authorizing agency preemption — that is, sim-
ply a ‘‘conclusion that state law is pre-empted.’’67 In
contrast with situations in which agencies explain how
state law would affect substantive federal regulation,
‘‘agencies have no special authority to pronounce on
preemption absent delegation by Congress.’’68
s The agency’s position was ‘‘inherently suspect’’ be-
cause its original notice of proposed rulemaking ex-
pressly stated that the rule would not preempt state law
or have ‘‘federalism implications,’’ and offered no no-
tice to the states of the FDA’s ‘‘sweeping position’’ on
preemption set forth in the preamble accompanying the
final rule.69
s The preamble could not be squared with the FDA’s
longstanding position that federal labeling rules set a
regulatory ‘‘floor’’ that is complemented, not under-
mined, by state tort law.70
s The preamble conflicted with the reality of drug
regulation. The FDA, Justice Stevens maintained, has
‘‘limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the
markets’’; manufacturers are more likely than the FDA
to observe post-marketing risks as they emerge; and
tort suits help ‘‘uncover unknown drug hazards and
provide incentives for’’ manufacturers to disclose risks
expeditiously.71
* * *
In concluding its opinion, the majority left open the
possibility that some state-law tort claims might frus-
trate congressional objectives, while reiterating that
Ms. Levine’s claim had not done so and affirming the
judgment of the Vermont Supreme Court.72
B. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Although joining fully in the majority opinion, Justice
Breyer wrote, as he has before,73 to state that because
state tort law may interfere with FDA labeling regula-
tion, the agency could, through ‘‘lawful specific regula-
tions,’’ seek to oust state law by deciding when FDA
regulation is ‘‘a ceiling as well as a floor.’’74 ‘‘It is pos-
56 21 C.F.R. § 201.80.
57 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
58 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 189.
59 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1199 n.5 (quoting government’s amicus brief).
62 Id. at 1199.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1199 & n.7 (citing initial version of FDCA and hear-
ing testimony).
65 Id. at 1200 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)). The Court also
noted that, in 1997, Congress preempted certain state require-
ments with respect to over-the-counter drugs, but preserved
state product liability claims. See id. at 1200 n.8 (citing 21
C.F.R. §§ 379r(e), 379s(d)).
66 Id. at 1204.
67 Id. at 1201 (emphasis in original).
68 Id. For this reason, Justice Stevens distinguished the
2006 preamble from the situation in Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000), which held that a Department
of Transportation regulation providing manufacturers various
options for passive restraints in automobiles preempted a dam-
ages suit premised on the defendant’s failure to install one type
of passive restraint (air bags). The Court in Geier gave weight
to ‘‘the agency’s explanation of how state law interfered with
its regulation,’’ as ‘‘further support’’ for the Court’s ‘‘indepen-
dent conclusion that the plaintiff’s tort claim obstructed the
federal regime.’’ Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203.
69 Id. at 1201.
70 Id. at 1201-02 & n.10 (relying on 63 Fed. Reg. 66378,
66384 (1998); 44 Fed. Reg. 37437 (1979); 59 Fed. Reg. 3948
(1994); Margaret Porter, ‘‘The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective
and Position,’’ 52 Food & Drug L. J. 7, 10 (1997)).
71 Id. at 1202 & nn.10-11 (citing governmental studies and
views of former FDA Commissioners explaining inadequacy of
FDA regulation and the agency’s inability to detect post-
marketing risks).
72 Id. at 1204.
73 See, e.g., Lohr, 518 U.S. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
74 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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sible,’’ Justice Breyer explained, that such a regulation
could ‘‘have pre-emptive effect.’’75
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in a
lengthy opinion staking out bold new positions on im-
plied preemption—both challenging the Court’s current
view of ‘‘impossibility’’ or ‘‘direct conflict’’ preemption
and calling for an end to ‘‘obstacle’’ or ‘‘frustration of
purposes’’ preemption.76 His opinion is likely to keep
the law reviews buzzing for some time. Because Justice
Thomas’s concurrence is unlikely to affect lower-court
litigation in the near term, just a few comments are ap-
propriate here.
Justice Thomas questioned whether ‘‘physical impos-
sibility’’ is the appropriate standard for assessing
whether federal and state law directly conflict, noting
that ‘‘if federal law gives an individual the right to en-
gage in certain behavior that state law prohibits, the
laws would give contradictory commands notwith-
standing the fact that an individual could comply with
both by electing to refrain from the covered behav-
ior.’’77 But whether or not denominated ‘‘physical im-
possibility,’’ Justice Thomas rejected conflict preemp-
tion in Ms. Levine’s case for much the same reasons as
had the majority: Wyeth’s ability under the CBE regula-
tion to amend its label without FDA pre-approval,78 and
its obligation ‘‘to revise the federally approved label ‘to
include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evi-
dence of an association of a serious hazard with a
drug.’ ’’79
Justice Thomas then rejected Wyeth’s claim of ‘‘im-
possibility’’ for another, more far-reaching reason: ‘‘To
say, as the [FDCA] does, that Wyeth may not market a
drug without federal approval (i.e., without an FDA-
approved label) is not to say that federal approval gives
Wyeth the unfettered right, for all time, to market its
drug with the specific label that was federally ap-
proved.’’80 But the same point could be made with re-
spect to any product that federal law allows on the mar-
ket, either via a preapproval process or otherwise. After
all, federal regulatory schemes always provide a manu-
facturer the choice whether to conform its conduct to
the agency’s dictates or to remove its product from the
market altogether. If Justice Thomas meant that con-
flict preemption does not apply whenever a manufac-
turer can remove its federally regulated product from
the market, rather than subjecting itself to new federal
regulatory obligations, it is difficult to see any room for
conflict preemption regarding such a product.
Moreover, for three interrelated reasons, Justice Tho-
mas expressed disapproval of any form of ‘‘obstacle’’ or
‘‘frustration of purposes’’ preemption. First, he main-
tained, it is at odds with various constitutional impera-
tives of federalism, including the Tenth Amendment, all
of which underscore the States’ retention of ‘‘substan-
tial sovereign authority’’ and seek ‘‘to protect [a] deli-
cate balance of power’’ between state and federal au-
thority.81
Second, he said, it is an affront to two, interlocking
constitutional commands: the Supremacy Clause,
which makes ‘‘supreme’’ only those laws ‘‘ ‘made in
Pursuance’ of the Constitution,’’82 and the Bicameral
and Presentment Clauses, which demand that the ‘‘pas-
sage of legislation’’ follow ‘‘ ‘a step-by-step, deliberate
and deliberative process.’ ’’83 According to Justice Tho-
mas, ‘‘[t]he Supremacy Clause thus requires that pre-
emptive effect be given only to those federal standards
and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily follow
from, the statutory text that was produced through the
constitutionally required bicameral and presentment
procedures.’’84
Third, ‘‘obstacle’’ or ‘‘frustration of purposes’’ pre-
emption is ‘‘problematic because it encourages an
overly expansive reading of statutory text,’’85 in a mis-
guided and error-inducing search for a statute’s pur-
poses.86 In this regard, Justice Thomas chided the ma-
jority for relying on the fact that Congress had not en-
acted an express preemption clause for prescription
drugs, noting that ‘‘the Court could just as easily rely on
its own perceptions regarding congressional inaction to
give unduly broad pre-emptive effect.’’87 Justice Tho-
mas was particularly critical of the Court’s decision in
Geier,88 where, he explained, the Court’s search for
meaning in ‘‘agency comments, regulatory history, and
agency litigating positions was inherently flawed,’’ be-
cause it was contradicted by a statutory provision that
expressly preserved common-law claims.89
In sum, Justice Thomas would narrow the circum-
stances in which implied preemption operates by refor-
mulating the concept of ‘‘impossibility’’ preemption and
eliminating ‘‘obstacle’’ or ‘‘frustration of purposes’’ pre-
emption, leaving most of the work of the Supremacy
Clause to Congress, rather than the courts, by forcing
Congress to speak clearly in the text of its enactments.
IV. Wyeth’s Future Effect
What effect will Wyeth have on future litigation and
on preemption jurisprudence? It makes sense, first, to
ask how the Court’s decision will affect tort cases in-
volving name-brand and generic prescription drugs,
and, then, to turn to its other implications.
A. Name-Brand Prescription Drugs
Wyeth will have its most immediate and important ef-
fect on state-law tort claims premised on a drug manu-
facturer’s alleged failure to warn of a risk associated
75 Id.
76 Justice Thomas briefly foreshadowed his Wyeth concur-
rence in 2005. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S.
431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
77 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1209 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Nelson, ‘‘Preemption,’’ 86 Va. L. Rev. 225,
260-61 (2000)).
78 Id. at 1209-10.
79 Id. at 1210 (quoting 21 C.F.R.§ 201.80(e)).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1205-06.
82 Id. at 1206 (quoting U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2)
83 Id. at 1207 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959
(1983).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1216.
86 Id. at 1207-08, 1212.
87 Id. at 1217.
88 See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861
(2000).
89 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1214 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 1214 n.6 (suggesting manipulability
of preemption analysis that looks to statutory purpose); see id.
at 1217 (‘‘purposes’’ doctrine ‘‘leads to decisions giving im-
properly broad pre-emptive effect to judicially manufactured
policies’’).
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with its name-brand prescription drug. Wyeth may not
eliminate the preemption defense in all such cases, but,
at the least, it will make that defense considerably more
difficult to sustain.90
The Supreme Court rejected ‘‘impossibility’’ preemp-
tion both because the CBE regulation permits a manu-
facturer unilaterally to update a label to provide safety
information and because a manufacturer is under a
continuing duty, under 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e), to revise
its label as soon as it learns of a safety-related problem
associated with the drug. Moreover, the Court rejected
preemption on the facts of Ms. Levine’s case because,
even though the label warned of the serious risks of ar-
terial exposure to Phenergan, ‘‘the FDA had not made
an affirmative decision to preserve the IV-push method
or intended to prohibit Wyeth from strengthening its
warning about IV-push administration.’’91
Taken together, these holdings place a significant
burden on tort defendants in drug-injury cases. The
Court itself explained that ‘‘[i]mpossibility preemption
is a demanding defense,’’92 which, in Wyeth, required
‘‘clear evidence’’ that the FDA would have prohibited a
strengthened warning about IV-push administration.93
In drug-injury cases where evidence of the relevant
harm is not known to the public or the medical commu-
nity until after the product has been marketed, the con-
cern may not have been before the FDA at the time the
label was approved.94 After the FDA has approved a
drug, if patients are encountering injuries associated
with a risk not adequately disclosed on the label, it will
be a rare case in which the manufacturer had earlier re-
quested a label change that, if made, would have pre-
vented the patient’s injury.
In Wyeth, the Court indicated that the agency’s gen-
eral consideration of the relevant risk (in Wyeth, of
gangrene from arterial exposure to Phenergan) or the
general risks of the form of drug administration (in
Wyeth, of intravenous versus intramuscular injection)
are not sufficient to trigger preemption when the plain-
tiff complains of a more specific inadequacy in the la-
bel. Rather, to have preemptive effect, the agency’s fo-
cus must be specific. And it must also be intense. Thus,
the Court noted with apparent approval that the FDA’s
‘‘ ‘passing attention to the issue of’ IV-push versus IV-
drip administration’’95 was not enough, in the Vermont
trial court’s view, to warrant preemption. The Court
went on to explain that Wyeth had failed to provide the
FDA ‘‘with an evaluation or analysis concerning the
specific dangers posed by the IV-push method,’’96 and
never ‘‘attempted to give the kind of warning’’ that led
to the jury’s decision to impose liability.97 In sum, it ap-
pears that, after Wyeth, the defendant must demon-
strate a tight fit between the labeling change proposed
by the manufacturer (and rejected by the FDA) and the
labeling change that the plaintiff contends would have
prevented her injuries.
Even in the unusual case where the manufacturer can
plausibly claim that it asked the FDA to amend the la-
bel to include a warning of the kind that the plaintiff al-
leges would have prevented her injuries, a drug com-
pany defendant may find it difficult to show that the
FDA would not have approved a stronger warning.
Agency officials are unlikely to cooperate in a search of
its files to determine what it ‘‘would have done’’ (but
did not do) with regard to label changes. If a manufac-
turer asks for a label change, and the agency does not
issue a formal rejection, that likely means that the
agency is still studying the question or is otherwise in-
different, not that there is, in Wyeth’s words, ‘‘clear evi-
dence’’ that the agency has rejected the proposed
change. As the Supreme Court has said repeatedly,
agency inaction is generally insufficient to preempt
state law because it cannot be understood to reflect the
official position of the federal government.98
For all of these reasons, after Wyeth, implied pre-
emption of failure-to-warn claims involving injuries
from prescription drugs is likely to be rare.99
B. Generic Prescription Drugs
Phenergan is a name-brand prescription drug that
entered the market after the FDA approved Wyeth’s
NDA. The second main pathway to marketing approval
is the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) es-
tablished by the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Amendments to
the FDCA,100 which sought to speed generic drugs to
market. Under Hatch-Waxman, after a name-brand
drug loses patent protection, a manufacturer may file
90 This section addresses Wyeth’s impact on drug-injury
claims alleging a failure to warn, which is the principal type of
claim in drug-injury litigation. It does not address Wyeth’s im-
pact, if any, on claims not premised on a failure to warn, such
as claims alleging design defect or breach of implied warranty.
Post-Wyeth, one court has found preemption where the plain-
tiff claimed that no warning would have been adequate be-
cause the drug was unreasonably dangerous. See Longs v.
Wyeth, 2009 WL 754524, *3-*4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2009); but
see Myers-Armstrong v. Actavis Totowa LLC, 2009 WL
1082026, *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (applying standard set
forth in Wyeth and rejecting preemption of claim that FDA-
approved drugs should not have been marketed in light of
safety hazards).
91 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1198.
94 See Lasser, et al., ‘‘Timing of New Black Box Warnings
and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications,’’ 287 J.A.M.A.
2215, 2218 (May 1, 2002) (‘‘Many serious ADRs [adverse drug
reactions] are discovered only after a drug has been on the
market for years. Only half of newly discovered serious ad-
verse drug reactions are detected and documented in the Phy-
sicians’ Desk Reference [the doctors’ drug labeling bible]
within 7 years after drug approval.’’).
95 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193 (quoting trial court finding).
96 Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67 (2002);
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286, 289-90 (1995);
Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum
Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988); cf. Rice v. Norman Williams
Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (‘‘The existence of a hypothetical
or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the preemption
of the state statute.’’).
99 The few post-Wyeth decisions issued to date suggest that
defendants will face a heavy burden in establishing preemp-
tion in cases involving prescription drugs. See Schrock v.
Wyeth, Inc., ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 635415, *2-*3 (W.D.
Okla. Mar. 11, 2009); Brockert v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
__S.W. 3d __, 2009 WL 997438 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2009); Mc-
Carrell v. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc., ___ A.2d ___, 2009 WL
614484, *43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 12, 2009) (noting
that preemption is the ‘‘exception’’ and that defendant must
establish that ‘‘it advocated . . . a stronger warning’’ and that
‘‘the FDA would not have approved [that] stronger warning’’);
see also IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 2009 WL 1098474, *23 n.23
(D. Vt. Apr. 23, 2009).
100 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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an ANDA, seeking FDA approval to market a generic
version of the name-brand drug.101 To simplify some-
what, a generic manufacturer need not submit indepen-
dent evidence of the drug’s safety and efficacy, but need
only establish the generic product’s ‘‘bioequivalence’’ to
the name-brand drug.102
In recent years, generic prescription drug manufac-
turers have argued that they are entitled to a special
form of preemption, beyond any preemption that might
be available to name-brand manufacturers, on the
ground that they are locked-in to the label approved for
the name-brand equivalent. In particular, they maintain
that the CBE regulation does not apply to them, and
they therefore lack authority to alter their labels with-
out FDA pre-approval. On the other hand, plaintiffs
have pointed to an FDA regulation that they claim ex-
pressly authorizes ANDA holders to employ the CBE
regulation.103 Prior to Wyeth, this issue had divided the
courts.104
This article is not the place to rehash those argu-
ments, which, in light of Wyeth, may no longer be criti-
cal. Even assuming that the CBE regulation cannot be
used by an ANDA holder to amend its label without
FDA pre-approval, Wyeth may nevertheless apply with
full force to cases involving generic drugs—that is, to
the same extent that it applies to name-brand drugs. Re-
call that the CBE regulation was not the exclusive, or
even the principal, basis for rejecting preemption in
Wyeth.105 Rather, Justice Stevens explained that
Wyeth’s quest for preemption was based on a ‘‘more
fundamental misunderstanding’’ of the regulatory re-
gime: that the ‘‘FDA, rather than the manufacturer,
bears primary responsibility for drug labeling.’’106 To
the contrary, ‘‘a central premise of federal drug regula-
tion [is] that the manufacturer bears responsibility for
the content of its label at all times.’’107 As the primary
authority for this attribute of federal drug regulation,
the Court cited 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e), which requires
manufacturers to revise their labels ‘‘as soon as there is
reasonable evidence of an association of a serious haz-
ard with a drug.’’ Section 201.80(e) applies to all manu-
facturers of prescription drugs, and the generic drug in-
dustry has not argued otherwise. Thus, after Wyeth, it
would appear that the preemption defense is available
to a generic drug manufacturer, if at all, only when it
can show that it asked the FDA to authorize a label
change of the kind that would have prevented the plain-
tiff’s injury and that the FDA would not have permitted
that change—the same standard that Wyeth imposes on
name-brand drug manufacturers.108
C. Medical Devices
The Supreme Court held last year in Riegel v.
Medtronic Inc.,109 that most tort claims regarding class
III medical devices that have gone through the FDA’s
pre-market approval process are preempted by the ex-
press preemption provision of the Medical Device
Amendments to the FDCA.110 Earlier, the Court held in
Medtronic v. Lohr, Inc.,111 that tort claims involving
medical devices that enter the market through less ex-
acting forms of FDA scrutiny are not preempted.
Wyeth does not alter the legal terrain regarding pre-
emption of tort claims involving medical devices. But
Wyeth may be politically significant and hasten Con-
gress’s consideration and passage of the Medical De-
vice Safety Act of 2009, which was introduced in both
Houses of Congress on March 5,112 and would overrule
Riegel by rendering the Medical Device Amendment’s
express preemption provision inapplicable to state-law
damages actions involving medical devices. Because
the approval processes for drugs and medical devices
are similar, and the purpose of FDA approval for both
types of products—to enhance the safety and effective-
ness of potentially dangerous but potentially life-saving
products—are identical, Congress may view it as
anomalous that injured drug patients, but not injured
device patients, have access to the civil justice system.
If, as Justice Stevens put it, ‘‘State tort suits uncover un-
known drug hazards and provide incentive for drug
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly,’’ and
‘‘serve a distinct compensatory function that may moti-
vate injured persons to come forward with informa-
tion,’’113 Congress may want such suits to serve the
same functions with respect to medical devices. In sum,
Wyeth may boost the chances for a congressional over-
ride of Riegel.
D. The Presumption Against Preemption
Wyeth emphatically reaffirmed the presumption
against preemption, which tort defendants have been
trying to eliminate for years. In particular, the Court re-
jected Wyeth’s argument that the presumption does not
apply in light of the federal government’s century-long
involvement in drug labeling, explaining that the pre-
sumption depends on ‘‘the historic presence of state
law,’’ not ‘‘on the absence of federal regulation.’’114 In
other words, longstanding federal domination and an
absence of a significant state-law role, not simply long-
101 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
102 See id. § 355(j)(8)(B) (defining bioequivalence); 21
C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (same).
103 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.97.
104 Compare, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prod. Corp.. 29 F.3d
165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994) (‘‘[G]eneric manufacturers . . . [are]
permitted to add or strengthen warnings and delete misleading
statements on labels, even without prior FDA approval.’’)
(dicta); Block v. Wyeth, Inc. 2003 WL 203067, *1 (N.D. Tex.
2003) (rejecting preemption because ‘‘manufacturer of a ge-
neric drug may alter a drug’s labeling’’ under 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.70(c), 314.97), with, e.g., Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562
F. Supp.2d 1056, 1061-65 (D. Minn. 2008) (finding preemption
on ground that ANDA holder cannot make label change).
105 See supra Part III.A.2.
106 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1997.
107 Id. at 1197-98.
108 In the two post-Wyeth generic drug-injury cases decided
to date, the Court rejected preemption under Wyeth and held
that the CBE regulation applies to generic drug manufacturers
as well as to name-brand drug manufacturers. See Kellogg v.
Wyeth, 2009 WL 975382, *4 (D. Vt. Apr. 10, 2009) (on denial of
certification for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(b)); Stacel v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, 2009 WL 703274,
*4-*7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2009); see also Schrock, 2009 WL
635415 (rejecting preemption in light of Wyeth in case involv-
ing generic and name-brand drugs, but not analyzing generic-
drug issue separately).
109 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
110 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
111 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
112 See S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1346, 111th Cong.
(2009).
113 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
114 Id. at 1195 n.3.
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standing federal presence, is required before the pre-
sumption will be set aside. Moreover, the Court rejected
the view, expressed in Justice Alito’s dissent,115 that the
presumption does not apply in implied conflict preemp-
tion cases.116 And earlier this Term, the Court noted
that the presumption applies to ‘‘questions of express or
implied preemption.’’117 At this point, the legitimacy of
the presumption against express and implied preemp-
tion in state-law tort cases appears settled.
E. Deference to Agency Pronouncements Regarding
Preemption
Wyeth provided guidance on the circumstances in
which a court should and should not defer to agency
rules or other pronouncements on preemption. The
Court made clear that it would not give full-fledged
Chevron deference to an agency’s ‘‘assertion’’ or ‘‘con-
clusion’’ that state law is preempted, at least absent an
express delegation from Congress instructing the
agency to issue rules or to otherwise make decisions re-
garding preemption.118 Thus, the Court contrasted
agency pronouncements such as the FDA’s 2006 regu-
latory preamble on preemption, which may be entitled
to ‘‘some weight,’’119 because they represent only an
agency’s unsolicited opinion on preemption, with a stat-
ute that authorizes the FDA to grant states exemptions
from the Medical Device Amendment’s express pre-
emption provision, and, thus, requires the agency to de-
fine the borderline between state and federal law.120
Wyeth’s holdings regarding deference are likely to be
influential. Their impact may be seen later this Su-
preme Court Term when the court decides Cuomo v.
The Clearinghouse Association, L.L.C., No. 08-453 (ar-
gued April 28, 2009). In Cuomo, the federal Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) claims that the Na-
tional Bank Act bars states from bringing enforcement
actions against national banks under generally appli-
cable state laws that themselves are not substantively
preempted by the Act. The questions presented in
Cuomo involve the validity of, and claimed deference
to, an OCC regulation that, the petitioner maintains,
does nothing more than assert that state enforcement
authority is preempted.121 Wyeth may make defense of
the OCC’s regulation more difficult.
In addition, the issuance of the FDA’s 2006 preamble
was not an isolated event, but rather part of a larger ef-
fort by Bush Administration agencies, including the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration,122 the
Consumer Product Safety Commission,123 and the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration,124 to insert language in
regulatory preambles and regulations purporting to
preempt state tort law. The level of deference, if any, to
be accorded these agency pronouncements will depend
on the thoroughness, consistency, formality, and per-
suasiveness of each effort, and the degree to which the
agency was acting, if at all, pursuant to a congressional
delegation.125 In light of Wyeth, however, agency
claims of preemption are likely to be subject to in-
creased judicial scrutiny, and it is unlikely that such
claims will be accorded substantial deference unless
they are tethered to a congressional authorization re-
garding preemption.126
115 See id. at 1228-29 & n.14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
116 See id. at 1195 n.3 (citing California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 10–102 (1989); Hillsborough County v. Au-
tomated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 716 (1985)).
117 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2009).
118 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
119 Id. (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 883).
120 See id. (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b)); see also id. at
1201 n.9 (referring to other statutes that authorize agencies to
determine scope of preemption).
121 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.40000. To view the questions presented
in Cuomo, see http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/08-
00453qp.pdf.
122 See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 49223, 42245-46 (2005) (preamble
to proposed rule on vehicle roof crush standards).
123 70 Fed. Reg. 13472, 13496 (2006) (preamble to final rule
on mattress flammability).
124 See, e.g., 72 Fed. Reg. 42016, 42028 (2007) (preamble to
proposed rule on front-end strength of cab cars and multiple-
unit locomotives).
125 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
126 See City of Joliet v. New West, L.P., __F.3d __, 2009 WL
937250, *4 (7th Cir. Apr. 9, 2009) (rejecting preemption views
of Department of Housing and Urban Development in light of
Wyeth.
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